From the Archives: In Quest of a ‘Greater Tajikistan’ Ahmad Shah planned the dismemberment of Afghanistan from the very beginning Source: General A.A. Liakhovskii, Chief of Staff, Soviet 40th Army Afghanistan By: Bruce G. Richardson During the Soviet/Afghan War and thereafter, many theories had been advanced and expounded upon relevant to the motives behind Ahmad Shah Massoud’s collaboration with the Soviet 40th Army.  Dominant amongst those theories, based on official Soviet documentation, the memoirs of former (KGB and GRU) intelligence officials, retired flag-officers who had served with the Soviet Fortieth Army in Afghanistan, and the ever-present  cornucopia of eye-witnesses, circumstantial and anecdotal evidence that in tandem have served to gain a preponderant currency with historians and researchers alike: Therein resides an evidence-based theory that attest and articulate to  Massoud’s  obsession to unite Afghanistan’s Tajik population with their co-ethnics in the then Soviet Republic of Tajikistan and the subsequent formation of an autonomous ‘Greater Tajikistan’ over which he himself would rule. To this end, Massoud strategized to co-opt and utilize the vast military power of the Soviet 40th Army to assist him in destroying his perennial nemesis, notably, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami. (Misdaq, p 330N). In his revealing memoir, Plamya Afgana, former Soviet 40th Army Chief of Staff, General A.A. Liakhovskii writes: ‘Ahmad Shah planned the dismemberment of Afghanistan from the very beginning.’ Documentary evidence in support of the ‘Greater Tajikistan’ thesis also awaits the researcher from within the pages of The Hand of Moscow, the personal memoir of a former intelligence (KGB) officialrevealing covert operations and strategy as employed by the Soviets during the war in Afghanistan. The author, General Leonid Shebarshin, former Director First Department KGB (Foreign Intelligence), has in this historical and remarkable memoir, produced and published two extraordinary facsimiles of original, heretofore classified top-secret documents enumerating details and conditions agreeing to end hostilities between Massoud and the Soviet High Command, commensurate with an agreement for the establishment of a quasi, expanded, and semi-autonomous Tajik enclave: Document: Points for Discussion with Ahmad Shah The creation with the context of a unified Afghanistan of Tajik autonomy on the basis of areas inhabited by Tajiks, including territories of the provinces of Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz, Baghlan, parts of Parwan-i-Kapisa, and also forms of self-government within this area.  Tajik representation and specific positions within the apparatus of the presidency, the National Parliament, and the Cabinet of Ministers of Afghanistan. Official recognition of the IOA (Islamic Movement in Afghanistan, Rabbani) as an independent party and one possessing equal rights in Afghanistan. Creation on the basis of the IOA formations of a regular Tajik military force and its inclusion in the VSRA. Definition of the tasks of this force both in respect to the national interest (presumably meaning Tajik interests) and in respect to general government tasks, including the safeguarding the route from Hairatan to Kabul. The establishing of peace within the framework of Tajik autonomy and the creation of conditions for the return of normal life to its population. Issues of economic development in the northeastern region. Cooperation on the part of the government of Afghanistan in this matter, as well as multifaceted-aid, including economic, medical and other sorts of aid, as well as the development of border trade. The issues which I have raised have been raised and agreed to by the Soviet Ambassador, Juri M. Vorontsov and by General V.I. Varennikov, who in their turn have cleared these issues with the leadership of the Republic.  (Source: The Operations Group of the MO SSSR in Afghanistan…Headquarters of the Fortieth Army, Kabul, 1988. Signatories: Lieutenant General B.V. Gromov, RA Minister of Defense, Shah Nawaz Tanai, and Ahmad Shah Massoud). (Shebarshin, pp 177-214).   Draft of a Protocol: Concerning Conditions for Mutual Relations Between the Leadership of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan And the Armed, Opposition of Panjsher (IOAP). ‘Motivated by good intent and a desire to consolidate peace in Afghanistan, the contracting parties have signed to the present protocol, in accordance with which they assume the following obligations’: To fully halt military actions in the Southern Salang and in other regions adjacent to the Kabul-Hairatan route, including any firing from any sort of weaponry upon positions held by brigades and groups of the IOA, villages, sentry brigades and posts of Soviet and Afghan troops, the MGB (Border Guards) and Tsarandoi. The armed detachments of the Panjsher take upon themselves responsibility for safeguarding communications between Tadzhikan and Chaugani with the aim of preventing shelling, robbery and other actions against Soviet and Afghan troops. The Soviet side undertakes to provide according to mutual agreement the necessary quantity of provisions, article of immediate necessity and other material within the time agreed upon by the parties for the material maintenance of Panjsher and those regions belonging to the indicated portion of the route. Detachments and groups of other parties will not be permitted to enter the region under discussion with the goal of firing upon Soviet and Afghan columns, carrying out terrorist acts, or sabotage of the pipeline. Should attempts by armed members of such parties to carry out these acts occur, the Soviet side expresses its willingness to provide the armed detachments of the Panjsher at their request with artillery and aviation support. To exchange information and exert cooperative efforts to seek out Soviet and Afghan citizens who have disappeared within the region under discussion. In the case of heightened tensions to conduct meetings with the purpose of mutual consultations concerning the avoidance of renewed military actions in the interest of maintaining peace in the specified zone. The effect of the present protocol extends throughout the territory stretching for 30 kilometers in both directions from the line of communication between Tadzhikan and Chaugani. Beyond these borders, Soviet troops and the armed forces of the Panjsher have the right to conduct operations aimed at liquidation of armed detachments and groups belonging to any parties which have not halted military action against the contracting side. The present protocol takes effect from the moment of signing. (Source: The Operations Group of the MO SSR in Afghanistan, Headquarters of the 40th Army, Kabul, December, 1988. Signatories: Lieutenant General B.V. Gromov, RA Minister of Defense Shah Nawaz Tanai, and Ahmad Shah Massoud).   (Shebarshin, pp 177-214). Beginning 1980, and spanning the entire Soviet/Afghan War period (1979-1989) Ahmad Shah Massoud contracted with the Soviets to protect their lines of supply along the vital Salang Highway. As part of this contractual partnership Massoud attacked those Mujahideen units who were engaged in attacking Soviet re-supply columns and troop emplacements. Often, Soviet and artillery support was provided Massoud to assist him in accomplishing his contractual obligations. On occasion, the agreements between Massoud and the Soviets would expire. Yet, even at those times Massoud continued to uphold the terms of the agreement until such time as they could be renewed. General Liakhovskii writes in his book that ‘Massoud did what we told him to do the entire time we were in Afghanistan.’ (Liakhovskii, pp 462-485).  From the Main Intelligence Directorate (MID) of the Soviet 40th Army, Kabul: ‘On the instructions of General P.I. Ivashutin, Head Main Intelligence Directorate (MID) of the USSR General Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Anatoly Tkachev established contacts with Ahmad Shah and, as he says, worked with the latter for a long period. Here is his story: ‘Through intermediaries, we agreed on the place and time on Ahmad Shah’s terms: Panjsher, the territory being controlled by Mojaheads, the new (1983) year eve. We were to come to the meeting place on the New Year night. We were also to arrive unguardedly and unarmed. As soon as the sun set we, together with our interpreter Max left Kishlak Rukha and soon reached the agreed place, where we were met by the group of armed Mojaheads led by Tajiddin, head of Ahmad Shah’s counter-intelligence. After the breakfast, Ahmad Shah with a confidant, I and interpreter Max stayed in the room. The talk began. While the key point in our proposals was the mutual cessation of armed counteraction in Panjsher and mutual obligations to provide conditions for the serene life of the population. Ahmad Shah said he didn’t feel hostile towards the Soviet Union. The results of the negotiations during those first and further meetings, was the actual termination of hostilities, and establishment of close cooperation in supervision of the truce.’ Drawing on Massoud’s KGB psychological profile which portrayed the ‘Lion’ as narcissistic, ego-driven, devious and prone to visions of grandeur, with himself serving as the Emir of a soon to be formed Tajik enclave, the Soviets negotiated from a position of strength by pandering to his quirks of personality and thereby priming Massoud to acquiesce to their demands. (Shebarshin, pp 177-214). For the Soviet contracting side a willingness to forge a truce with Massoud is best understood in tactical considerations. Key for the Soviets was uninterrupted re-supply along the Salang thoroughfare, and avoiding combat in the dangerous and precipitous mountain fastness of Panjsher. The danger inherent in engaging in guerrilla warfare in rugged terrain is exemplified by the often-quoted General Boris V. Gromov, Commander 40th Army Afghanistan, who said ‘Massoud could convert the area into a graveyard for the Russian troops by only throwing rocks.’ (Gromov, pp 188-197).  As might be expected, area resistance reaction to Massoud’s agreements with the Soviets brought a swift and bitter response: From War in Afghanistan, by Mark Urban: ‘Some commanders criticized Massoud for not fighting the Soviet Army more actively. Between the Kunduz fighting in April and January 1989, nearly two years, there is no evidence that Massoud ever willingly used his men against the Soviets in anything more than a skirmish. On the other hand there is evidence that Massoud entered into some form of truce with the Soviets. There were signs that the Soviets wanted to hand over the control of north-eastern Afghanistan to the Shura-i-Nizar. Reports surfaced that the Russians were offering him money and weapons for such a bargain. The agreements caused bitter controversy within the resistance. Members of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s party called it a sell-out and lampooned Massoud as the “king of the Panjsher.” In return for the promise of no attacks from the Panjsher the Soviets withdrew the bulk of their forces from the valley and re-deployed them to southern regions where the resistance continued to engage in resisting Soviet forces.’(Urban, p 229). In 1980 and 1983, British author Mike Martin traveled for hundreds of miles inside Afghanistan with the resistance, the result of which is his authoritative book Afghanistan, Inside a Rebel Stronghold. Mike Martin’s narrative skills and analysis provide additional insight and source material for researchers. (Martin, p 198). Martin: I began to hear the same theory over and over about the role being played by Massoud in the Panjsher. His temporary truce with the Russians had not been rescinded. His Jamiat fighters were being sent to try to take over Hezb villages beyond the Panjsher. The Russians were actually supplying him with arms so that he could try to defeat Hezb, who the Russians regarded as their most implacable foe.’(Martin, p 198). Conclusion: Details of the KGB conspiracy to partition Afghanistan, is well known. The ethnic wedge and partition strategy was successful for the Soviets in Central Asia and became their modus operandi in Afghanistan as well. Operation Kaskad, as it is known in Soviet parlance, was a plan drafted to dismember or partition the northern regions of Afghanistan over which Ahmad Shah Massoud would rule, albeit with limited autonomy. General Liakhovskii wrote in his book that Massoud coveted the concept of a ‘Greater Tajikistan’ and worked toward that end for the entire decade of war. (Liakhovskii, pp 485-486, Richardson, pp 22-23). Sources: Literally hundreds of pages and documents await the researcher in the following list of publications as enumerated below. Documentary, eye-witness, anecdotal and episodic evidence attest to Ahmad Shah Massoud’s obsession with the formation of a ‘Greater Tajikistan’. A virtual treasure trove of information exists in these publications relevant to his many and varied truce and cease-fire agreements with the Soviet High Command Afghanistan. As the enumerated list of authors attest, his comportment allowed for the re-deployment of Russian troops from Panjsher to areas of the south where stiff-resistance against Soviet occupation continued unabated. And as specified in the agreement, the Soviet military, at his request, provided Massoud with air bombardment and artillery backup for his skirmishes with Hezb and other resistance groups in opposition and while engaged in attacking elements of the Soviet military along the vital Salang. In addition, considerable evidence demonstrates that as Soviet re-supply columns were allowed to traverse Salang unhindered resulted in a prolongation of the war. (Liakhovskii, pp 462-485).  *A.A Liakhovskii, Plamya Afgana, Moscow, Iskon, 1999, translated for Cold War in History Project, CWIHP, Washington, D.C. by Gary Goldberg. *Main Intelligence Directorate (MID) of the General Headquarters, USSR Armed Forces, title: Lion of the Panjsher, Article no. 18, (No. 882/83-3-5-77, Fond 80, Perechen 14, Document 77, translation of excerpts by Elena Kretova, Information Services, Moscow. *Boris V. Gromov, Limited Contingent, Moscow, Progress Press, 1994, translated by Professor Ian Helfant, Department of Slavic Languages and Literature, Harvard University. *Leonid Shebarshin, The Hand of Moscow, Moscow, Progress Press, 1992, translated by Professor Ian Helfant, Department of Slavic Languages and Literature, Harvard University.  Bruce Richardson, Afghanistan, A Search for Truth, Free Forum, ME, 2009. Bruce Richardson, Afghanistan, Ending the Reign of Soviet Terror, Maverick Publications, OR, 1996 Mike Martin, Inside a Rebel Stronghold, LBS, UK,1984.  Nabi Misdaq, Afghanistan, Political Frailty and External Interference, Routledge, NY, 2006.  Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan, Macmillan, UK, 1990.  Pardes Mosafir, The Red Army in Afghanistan, Peshawar, 1997 (Pashto) *S.E. Grigor’ev, The Pandzhsher from 1975-1990, Saint Petersburg University Press, 1997. *Publications by Russian authors are available from East View Press, Minneapolis, MN. Orthography:  Variations in the rendering of names and places are in accord with common usage in the original language of the translated texts.