| KABUL’S HORIZONS |
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| Source: |
The Telegraph |
By: |
Krishnan Srinivasan |
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Foreign interventions were habitual during the process of Afghan nation-formation in the 19th and 20th centuries; they were usually resisted, and contributed nothing to the welfare of the Afghans, who harbour a well-known and well-merited aversion to foreigners. The present Afghan war has been going on for more than 30 years and, during those years, several million Afghans were killed and more than 10 million have fled, leaving 28 million in the country. Almost all the great powers tested their military hardware there, promises of peace and democracy degenerated into more war and devastation, and uncountable fruitless operations resulted in bloodshed, hatred, horror, and an increase in drug production.
The Taliban, ruling Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, are best remembered for barbaric Islamist practices and the wanton destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas. From 2001 onwards, under United Nations security council resolutions, an international security assistance force was set up, initially to protect the government of Hamid Karzai, and then to eliminate al Qaida and combat insurgents. The ISAF has 100,000 troops from the United States of America and 40,000 from 48 other countries engaged in what is already the longest military exercise in US history. But there is no international consensus on the limits or objectives of intervention. The Americans themselves seem hardly to know why they are there. They assert they have no quarrel with the Afghans; it is only al Qaida that is the enemy. Speaking to me at the time of the ISAF’s creation, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, then the secretary general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, envisaged an early withdrawal when democracy and rule of law were established in Afghanistan. That type of nation-building did not succeed in Kosovo or Albania or Bosnia in Europe: how was it ever possible in Afghanistan?
Afghanistan is portrayed as the most acute security problem in the world, and the Taliban as a threat to regional and global peace. Is terror contained because of the presence of the ISAF or Nato? The answer depends on the definition of the Taliban. People everywhere have heard of these Afghan ‘students’, but to describe their objectives, apart from the removal of foreigners from their country, is problematic. Despite the presence of the ISAF, 65 per cent of Afghanistan is under Taliban sway. The Talibs are now vastly different from the pre-2001 variety, being younger, more skilled at propaganda, and closer to al Qaida, Wahabis and Salafis. They have better tactics, use guerrilla methods and are entrenched even in urban areas. They obtain widespread Afghan respect because they are seen as fully opposed to foreigners. Karzai himself describes the Talibs as ‘disenfranchised brothers’, thereby confusing the people and his army.
The Karzai government’s control continuously shrinks in the face of the Taliban, and security deteriorates every year. Al Qaida has been disrupted by the US offensive and the death of Osama bin Laden but jihadi terrorism will continue for as long as it has the support of the Pakistan State. The Taliban are far from degraded owing to their safe havens in Pakistan. Calling Pakistan the “epicentre” of global terrorism, Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, has said that America cannot succeed in Afghanistan unless terrorist safe havens in Pakistan are shut down. So the prime obstacle to removing the threat of terror is clearly identified.
The ISAF’s aim to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat” al Qaida and its principal backers, the Taliban, has been modified more realistically. This year, according to President Barack Obama, the US will start transferring out of Afghanistan and 2014 is the timeline to shift authority to Kabul. This is made easier by bin Laden’s demise. The immediate goal is to secure an agreement with the Taliban because the Afghan army and police cannot cope with internal and external threats unless the level of threat is reduced. This exit strategy is only about exit and not strategy, according to Henry Kissinger.
Afghanistan must prepare for the reality of US military withdrawal. There is wide disapproval of the Afghan campaign in the US and in all Nato countries, making it politically impossible to stay on. The US military budget, at this time of economic strife, is higher than the rest of the world combined, and the ratio between the highest and the average incomes in the US is an unacceptable 120:1. American troops may remain in Kandahar and former Soviet-era bases, not for the sake of Afghanistan, but to maintain surveillance over Pakistan’s nuclear facilities that are vulnerable to terrorists. Washington will not make this public, unless it is obliged to by domestic political considerations.
There has been some development in Afghanistan; it is not a medieval or broken state. There have been advances since 2001 with regard to media and civil society, roads, railways and power. Six million children go to school, of whom 38 per cent are girls. In 2001, only one million were in school, all boys. There is primary health in two-thirds of the country as opposed to 10 per cent in 2001. But there are setbacks in economy and security, rule of law, corruption and narcotics, and human rights abuses are perpetrated both by the government and the insurgents. Reconstruction in Afghanistan needs prolonged engagement with the West and the UN since it will need huge funding. The US says it is committed to Afghanistan’s development but, as the largest donor, its aid has too closely been tied to counter-insurgency strategies, with the blurring of humanitarian and military objectives.
In politics too, there have been serious errors. External controls over governance have weakened moves for Afghan self-government. The Afghans have a tradition of decentralized authority, whereas the US stresses a strong centre, though it simultaneously undermines it by dealing directly with warlords and local power groups. Sub-governance is probably the answer, but all Afghans will oppose American suggestions of balkanization into quasi-sovereign provinces or seven administrative units that correspond roughly to ethno-political divisions. There is corruption at all levels, with the ISAF itself guilty of paying protection money to local warlords. Counter-narcotics policies are not succeeding, and non-governmental organizations act like parallel authorities. The polity is a hybrid between the traditional and the modern, and debates about a presidential or a parliamentary system and the role of shuras and jirgas in any future dispensation continue. Despite the problems in determining legitimacy, the West will have to relax its control over outcomes. Elections have failed to produce an Afghan voice, and the old forms of consensus-building like the shura and jirga have not succeeded.
In the search for a solution, various regional approaches have been mooted, especially since diverse ethnicities in Afghanistan need reconciliation. The ethno-linguistic complexities are immense, with Pashtun, Uzbek, Tajik and Hazara majorities living outside the country and only the minority within Afghanistan. The neighbours act out competing and conflicting interests, as do outsiders like Saudi Arabia with its profound links with the Taliban. Pakistan wants to exclude any Indian influence in what it regards as its backyard; Iran cannot accept Shias being treated as apostates by Wahabis; China fears Uighur contamination by Islamic extremism; Central Asia fears narcotics and terrorism. The US refuses to involve Iran, while any armed action against Iran by the US or Israel will hugely increase radicalism in the Middle East and Central Asia with unpredictable consequences. Pakistan can be a deal-maker or deal-breaker, but a Pakistani brokered peace will not be acceptable to its neighbours or to all the Afghans.
There is no such thing as a card-carrying Taliban. Pashtuns and Talibs are not synonymous and the Taliban are not monolithic. The Talibs are in at least three formations — Mullah Omar’s Quetta Shura, Haqqani in North Waziristan (with a strong Arab element and attached to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence) and the Pakistani Taliban. Each Taliban group has a different leadership with different agendas. The Taliban are more of a ‘movement’ intending to defeat ISAF/Nato and reclaim Afghanistan. Ethnicity and Islam are not cementing factors, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the mujahid of anti-Soviet vintage, is a constant spoiler, and the Taliban will not cohere after any settlement and the Nato troops’ withdrawal.
But moves for a settlement are constantly afoot and will now accelerate. Karzai is moving closer to regarding Pakistan as essential for his continuation, and Burhanuddin Rabbani, a former Afghan president, is acting as his intermediary with the Quetta Shura, though the US does not want Mullah Omar in the reconciliation process. The process among the various players is highly opaque. There are whispers of future talks, perhaps in the Gulf, or in Turkey. The broad principles could be no partition, no single outside power to be dominant, no handover to Pakistan, no reversion to the status quo, no imposed neutrality, the Afghans to own the process, and Afghanistan’s independence and sovereignty to be guaranteed by Pakistan.
It is unlikely that any talks will be fruitful unless there is a prior end to combat operations, and in addition to insurgents, any negotiation must include formal and informal power holders, and should ideally include obligations to human rights and accountability — though enforcement will be impossible. But there is a saying in Afghanistan: “In principle, no compromise; in compromise, no principle.” And that, finally, is likely to be the untidy and unsatisfactory outcome.
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