Afghan Warlord Outlines Peace Plan   Source: Wall Street Journal By: Yaroslav Trofimov   One of the three main leaders of the Afghan insurgency, mercurial warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, has a long history of switching sides, and once fought against his current Taliban allies. Now, he has held out the possibility of negotiating with Afghan President Hamid Karzai and outlined a roadmap for political reconciliation, opening what could be the most promising avenue for Mr. Karzai's effort to peacefully resolve the conflict. It is far from certain that any talks with Mr. Hekmatyar will begin, let alone succeed. But in contrast to Taliban leader Mullah Omar and allied insurgent chief Sirajuddin Haqqani, who refuse any talks with Kabul as long as foreign troops remain in the country, Mr. Hekmatyar took a much more conciliatory line in a recent video. "We have no agreement with the Taliban—not for fighting the war, and not for the peace," said Mr. Hekmatyar, who commands the loyalty of thousands of insurgents. "The only thing that unites the Taliban and [us] is the war against the foreigners." Unlike in previous videos, where Mr. Hekmatyar used a Kalashnikov rifle as a prop and expressed support for al Qaeda, in the latest tape, recorded in late December and provided to The Wall Street Journal by his aides in Pakistan, he assumed a professorial tone, wearing glasses and a black turban as he spoke in a quiet, soft voice. Mr. Hekmatyar, who is 59 years old and lived in exile in Iran when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan, built his movement over the last three years into a formidable force. His men dominate the insurgency in several eastern and central Afghan provinces, such as Kunar, Laghman and Kapisa, according to American intelligence estimates. At the same time, a legal wing of Hizb-e-Islami, an Islamist party that Mr. Hekmatyar founded in the 1970s, participates in the Afghan parliament, with 19 of 246 seats. One of its leaders is minister of the economy in Mr. Karzai's new cabinet. Though the legal Hizb-e-Islami denies formal links with Mr. Hekmatyar, many of its senior members are believed to maintain communications with the grizzled warlord, and openly support the idea of bringing him into the government. Mr. Hekmatyar's "reported willingness to reconcile with the Afghan government" has already become a key factor working against the militancy because it "causes concern that others may follow," the U.S.-led international forces' intelligence chief, Maj. Gen. Michael Flynn, noted in a recent presentation. In addition to subtracting fighters from the battlefield, such a reconciliation would boost the legitimacy of the Kabul government. Currently, fighters of the three main groups—Mullah Omar's Taliban in the south, where the bulk of combat takes place, the Haqqani network in the southeast, and Mr. Hekmatyar's men in its strongholds—cooperate with each other, at least on the tactical level, American intelligence officials say. But, while Mr. Haqqani made a formal oath of allegiance to Mullah Omar, recognizing him as his overall leader, Mr. Hekmatyar repeatedly refused to make such a pledge. In the tape, he said he spent "a couple of months" with Mullah Omar and al Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahri in 2002, but insisted that he "had no direct or indirect contact with them since then." He also said that the main reason he's fighting American forces is because the U.S. allied itself with his bitter Afghan enemies after the Taliban's downfall in 2001. "It's just a convenience for Hekmatyar to be with the Taliban," says Marc Sageman, a terrorism expert who, as a Central Intelligence Agency officer in Pakistan, worked with Afghan insurgent leaders in the late 1980s. "Hekmatyar's main goal is Hekmatyar. He'll do anything that will help him out—it all depends on the deal he's going to get." In the tape, Mr. Hekmatyar outlined his political program, calling for elections under a neutral caretaker government once U.S.-led forces withdraw, predicting that Hezb-i-Islami will win 70% of the votes, and saying that he would accept an impartial international peacekeeping force. While the Taliban brand Mr. Karzai a traitor, Mr. Hekmatyar promised to support the Afghan president should he stop being subservient to his American backers. "Negotiations with the Afghan government will not be fruitful unless the foreigners give the Afghan government the authority to start negotiations independently—but unfortunately it has not been given this authority yet," Mr. Hekmatyar said in the tape. Similar overtures by Mr. Hekmatyar in recent months failed to produce any breakthrough. And, while some Afghan and American officials have already explored indirect contacts with Mr. Hekmatyar, the U.S. government so far refuses to make a meaningful distinction between him and the two other man insurgent chiefs. "Each one has a different origin and orientation," says Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. "But all work together and are linked to al Qaeda." A Pashtun former engineering student from the northern Kunduz province, Mr. Hekmatyar started out in politics as a pro-Soviet Communist. He embraced pan-Islamist ideology in the 1970s, and famously refused to meet President Ronald Reagan even as the U.S. was pumping millions of dollars into his guerrilla movement through the Pakistani intelligence in the 1980s. After the pro-Soviet regime collapsed in 1992, Mr. Hekmatyar reduced large parts of Kabul to rubble as he fought rival mujahedeen commanders for control of the capital, and briefly served as the nation's prime minister. Once Pakistan switched its support to the nascent Taliban movement in the mid-1990s, Mr. Hekmatyar was chased out by the Taliban, and had to seek refuge in Iran. After the U.S. overthrew the Taliban in 2001, it excluded the warlord—who was seen as a spent force—from the new Kabul government. In the following months, as an embittered Mr. Hekmatyar started voicing support for the Taliban and al Qaeda, he was expelled by Iran, and was nearly killed by a U.S. airstrike. In 2003, Mr. Hekmatyar was designated a terrorist by the U.S. and put on the United Nations blacklist alongside Mullah Omar and Mr. bin Laden. These days, some American officials say, Mr. Hekmatyar has managed to rebuild his fortunes in part because of help from elements of the powerful Pakistani spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate. Mr. Hekmatyar's movement uses the area around the Pakistani city of Peshawar, with its teeming Afghan refugee camps, as its logistics hub. His daughter and son-in-law reside in the Pakistani capital, Islamabad. Pakistan denies it is giving any aid to the Taliban or its insurgent allies. "Hekmatyar could be turned if the ISI wanted him to be turned," says Bruce Riedel, a Brooking Institution scholar and former senior CIA officer who oversaw President Barack Obama's Afghanistan and Pakistan policy review last year. "He is too closely tied to them to operate for us without their okay."

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